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Ministers of Finance in Western Europe: 
A Special Career?
J.Biondel
European University Institute, Florence
Ministers of finance occupy a special place in cabinet 
governments and indeed probably in every government. Their role is 
unique, as they alone have the opportunity to supervise the 
current activities and to shape the characteristics of the future 
activities of all the other ministers. They are indeed often 
regarded as somewhat above the ordinary ministers both by the 
public and by specialist observers. Yet the precise extent to 
which they are indeed 'above' other ministers has not been 
ascertained, in particular on a comparative basis: some finance
ministers are obviously very influential, but the extent to which 
this influence is shared by all their counterparts needs to be 
assessed.
Such an investigation can be fully undertaken only by 
means of a systematic scrutiny of the role of ministers of finance 
in the cabinets to which they belonged - a task which is obviously 




























































































comprehensively, particularly since the influence of ministers of 
finance is likely to vary, both from country to country and from 
individual to individual. There are, however, indirect means by 
which at least a preliminary assessment can be attempted: one of 
these is provided by the examination of the careers of these 
ministers. The present paper constitutes an exploration of the 
extent to which such an examination of careers can help to 
discover patterns of influence among finance ministers.
Ministerial careers and patterns of influence
Two aspects of the careers of ministers of finance are 
likely to play a substantial part in determining the probable 
influence of these ministers over their cabinet colleagues. One is 
their occupational background; the other is their seniority. A 
third element, which relates to the structure of the government 
rather than to the career proper, but is associated to it, needs 
also to be taken into account: there are governments where more 
than one cabinet member is in charge of financial affairs, in 
particular where there is a minister of economics alongside the 
minister of finance; in such a case, the question of the overall 






























































































The study of the background of ministers, and of finance 
ministers in particular, is naturally interesting in its own 
right: it is valuable to know from which occupational groups 
ministers are drawn in order to assess, for instance, how far 
governments are 'representative'; one can also discover how far 
ministers have the managerial and technical skills required to 
direct the nation. But the study of the occupational background is 
also valuable in that it can provide indications as to what the 
influence of ministers is likely to be: those who have specialised 
professional skills can be expected to have substantial authority 
vis-a-vis their colleagues as well as be on equal terms with the 
civil servants in their department.
In the case of most cabinet members, any authority 
arising from their professional knowledge will only affect 
marginally the life of their colleagues; in the case of finance 
ministers, on the contrary, the authority acquired in this way 
will mean a greater opportunity to give a general direction to the 
life of the government and to create a climate (of expansion or 
retrenchment) which will affect the behaviour of other ministers. 
Indeed, the professional authority may have an effect on the role 
of the prime minister who may feel obliged to support the finance 
minister without being necessarily convinced of the strength of 




























































































background may not always be accompanied by the political skills 
required to maintain the authority which this professional 
background may have given; but, in the first instance at least, 
some finance ministers whose background is in finance or economics 
are likely to be regarded by their colleagues as having to be 
listened to, especially if the economic and financial situation of 
the country is difficult. Only gradually will the need for 
political skills begin to arise: at that point, however, the 
matter of the seniority of the finance minister will also start to 
have an effect.
Seniority and influence
The effect of seniority on the influence of ministers of 
finance is rather complex. Three elements need to be taken into 
account, the time spent in the department, the time spent 
previously in the cabinet, and the time spent in the cabinet 
afterwards. Duration in the post and time spent in the cabinet 
before as head of the Treasury will tend to increase the influence 
of the holder of the post, at least to begin with. After a number 
of years, this influence is unlikely to increase, at least at the 
same rate. On the other hand, the time spent in the cabinet by ex- 
ministers of finance is likely to reduce the influence of the 
current holder of the post, though this is likely to depend on 
individuals. Some ex-ministers of finance may have a low prestige 




























































































important that their successors find it difficult to exercise any 
autonomous power. By and large, however, ministers of finance are 
probably somewhat constrained by the suggestions and, even more, 
by the negative comments of their predecessors who still belong to 
the cabinet.
Ex-ministers of finance can hold a variety of positions. 
They can in particular hold the one which is the most important of 
all, that of prime minister (and, in the Finnish and French cases, 
of president of the Republic). In such a case, the minister of 
finance is likely to be subjected to particular pressure, although 
it is not in the interest of the prime minister (or president) to 
undermine the authority of the Treasury head and although, on the 
other hand, all prime ministers naturally take some part in 
decisions relating to finance. While differences can be expected 
among prime ministers, it is highly probable that a finance 
minister is somewhat more constrained when the head of the 
government was previously head of the Treasury.
One or more ministers of finance
The influence of the minister of finance will also be 
affected where there is more than one cabinet minister concerned 
with financial questions. This situation prevails in about half 
the Western European countries, either in the form of separate 




























































































the existence of a special economics portfolio. There are 
substantial variations in the relative influence of the holders of 
these posts both from country to country and over time within each 
country. Three general points can be made, however. First, it is 
generally recognised that, where there is more than one minister 
in charge of financial affairs, one of them is regarded as senior 
and the others are, formally or simply in practice, hierarchically 
dependent on the 'top' minister. This is in particular the case in 
Britain and Italy where the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Minister of the Treasury respectively are regarded as the senior 
ministers. Thus the authority of this senior minister may not be 
undermined by the existence of such a 'team'. It can even be 
reinforced, though this may not be the case if, as can occur in 
coalitions, the different ministers are from different parties.
Second, on the other hand, in countries where the cabinet 
includes continuously a minister of economics alongside the 
finance minister, there is probably some division of authority. 
One of the ministers may be truly senior, but there is no uniform 
pattern. A 'dual' arrangement of this kind has existed since World 
War II in six countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands). The effect is probably generally to 
decrease somewhat the role of each of these ministers, except in 
Germany, where the economics minister is regarded as the more




























































































Third, portfolios of economics have also been created 
elsewhere from time to time. In Britain, for instance, the Labour 
party decided to set up a separate economics superminister in 1947 
and in 1964. In neither case was the experiment encouraging. The 
post of economics minister was then discontinued. In France, 
economics ministers were appointed between 1976 and 1981 when the 
prime minister, R. Barre, also took over the finance post. These 
economics ministers were clearly less influential than the 
government head. In Sweden, economics ministers were also 
appointed in the early post World War II period and during the 
'bourgeois' coalitions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In ail 
these cases, the experiment did not last long enough to warrant 
these ministers being included in this analysis.
The study which is conducted here is therefore based on 
the examination of the careers of one minister of finance only, 
except in those countries in which there has always been a 
separate minister of economics. In these cases, both minister have 
been considered. Fourteen countries are being examined. The period 
of analysis extends from 1945 to 1984, except for West Germany, 
where the analysis naturally begins with the setting up of the 
Federal Republic in 1949, and for France, where the study begins 
in 1958 with the advent of the Fifth Republic, as the pattern of 
ministerial turnover during the Fourth Republic was vastly 




























































































Portugal, Greece, and Malta are excluded on the ground that the 
period during which the regime was parliamentary was relatively 
short while Switzerland is not considered because the system is 
not parliamentary. 218 ministers are therefore being examined 
here, 165 of whom had been ministers of finance in the strict 
sense of the word (though not necessarily with this title). The 
remaining 53 ministers had been in charge of economics and not of 
finance in the six countries in which such posts existed 
continuously since the end of World War II (Table 1).
Four aspects of the career of these ministers are being 
considered in order to assess the possible impact of these careers 
on their influence. These are occupational background, duration in 
office, in particular at the head of the finance department, 
presence in the cabinet before and presence in the cabinet after 
having held a post in the Treasury. Findings relating to finance 
posts are compared and contrasted with those of all cabinet 
ministers, but, as numbers for each country are obviously small, 
conclusions have naturally to be somewhat tentative in many 
respects.
Ocupational background
It is often believed that, in parliamentary systems, 




























































































because of their political skills rather than because of their 
managerial or technical background. This view has some validity, 
but a detailed examination of careers of cabinet members in 
Western Europe shows that there are also appreciable variations 
from this model. There is in reality a strong contrast between two 
types of cabinets, those which might be labelled truly 
parliamentary (in Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy), 
on the one hand, and those which are more 'managerial' (in 
Austria, Finland, Fifth Republic France, the Netherlands, and 
Norway) where many ministers come often directly from a position 
in the public sector or from private business and head departments 
where they can use the skills which they acquired in their 
previous job. This distinction is also associated with a tendency 
for ministers to be drawn almost exclusively (in the first case) 
and to a much lesser extent (in the second) from among members of 
parliament. Germany and Sweden constitute intermediate situations 
between these two groups, while it is more difficult to generalise 
about Iceland and Luxembourg, where many ministers hold multiple 
positions because of the small size of the cabinet.
The careers of ministers of finance reflect to an extent 
similar characteristics, but there is also a tendency towards a 
specialised background in several of the countries in which other 
ministers are usually 'amateurs'. Not surprisingly, the proportion 




























































































Netherlands, and Austria, while it is low in Ireland and, among 
ministers of finance stricto sensu, in Denmark. But it is higher 
than might have been expected in Belgium, Britain, and Italy, 
where almost half the ministers of finance were drawn fron what 
might be regarded as groups of specialists. It is also high in 
Germany, where all the economics ministers and a large majority of 
the finance ministers were specialists. Conversely, with only half 
their finance ministers drawn from among specialist groups, Norway 
and Finland rank somewhat lower than might have been expected. 
Overall, ministers of finance in the fourteen countries examined 
here fall into three broad categories, those in which the 
proportion of specialists is very high (over three-quarters) 
(Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), those where it is 
low (a quarter to a third) (Iceland, Ireland), and those in which 
it forms about half the total (the remaining eight countries) 
(Table 2).
The nature of the specialisation varies appreciably, 
however, as it can originate from three broad types of careers - 
the civil service, industry and banking, and teaching or research. 
In all the countries excpet Luxembourg and Norway, at least one or 
two ministers of finance were professors of economics or 
ecomomists. But the bulk of the specialist careers are those which 
emerge from the civil service or from the private sector. 




























































































distribution between these careers. In Austria, France, Norway, 
Luxembourg (and to a more limited extent Ireland and Sweden), 
specialists are mostly drawn from the public sector. In Belgium, 
Britain, Germany, and Iceland, they are mainly issued from the 
private sector. In Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, they come 
almost equally from the two origins.
There is therefore a tendency for ministers of finance to 
have a more specialised background than other ministers. Although 
the ranking of the countries in terms of specialisation is not the 
same as it is for ministers in general, there are no countries in 
which the proportion of specialists is lower among finance and 
economics ministers than it is among ministers in general. If, as 
was suggested earlier, a specialist background is likely to give 
substantial authority to the heads of the Treasury vis-a-vis their 
colleagues at least at the beginning of their tenure, it seems 
permissible to conclude that, in most countries, ministers of 
finance are often likely to have this authority, even if it comes 
to be eroded after a period unless specialist skills are backed by 
other characteristics.
Duration in office
Ministers of finance need to be rather senior in order to 




























































































acquire this seniority is by remaining in office for long periods, 
whether as ministers of finance or in other posts. There is indeed 
a tendency for this to occur in Western Europe, though there are 
variations in the extent to which the tenure of ministers of 
finance is longer than that of other ministers. In three 
countries, the duration in office of ministers of finance 
(including other posts which these might have had) is not markedly 
longer than that of their colleagues: these are Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden; as a matter of fact, this duration is 
even shorter in one country, Austria. In Belgium, Finland, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway, the duration in office 
of finance ministers is about fifty percent longer that that of 
other ministers. Finally, in Britain, Denmark, Fifth Republic 
France, and Italy, ministers of finance stay in office about two- 
thirds longer than other ministers (Diagram 1).
There seems to be some tendency for ministers of finance 
to stay in office longer where the average duration of all 
ministers is relatively low: this is true of Italy, France, or 
Denmark; conversely, in Austria, Germany, or Sweden, the average 
duration of ministers of finance is not markedly longer than that 
of all ministers. But the trend is not universal: the duration of 
both ministers of finance and of other ministers in office is 




























































































While the overall duration in office of ministers who 
came to be, for a period of at least, ministers of finance is 
longer than that of other ministers, it does not follow that all 
ministers of finance, or even the majority, are heads of the 
Treasury for long periods. Some are, but others remain in that 
post for very few years. Five Irish cabinet ministers who have 
been heads of the Treasury during their career have been in office 
for between 14 and 19 years: yet only one of these was minister of 
finance for a long period (nine years), while the other four were 
in that job for between one and four years only. Overall, nearly 
half the Western European ministers cf finance and of economics 
remained in a Treasury post for two years or less and as many as a 
quarter for a year or less. Such a state of affairs does not 
suggest, to say the least, that all the ministers of finance are 
likely to have been very influential, even if some of these short­
term Treasury heads were drawn from one of the specialist groups 
which we just examined. A few may have wielded considerable 
influence, but the large majority of this group were probably 
regarded as mere 'holders' of the position and therefore unlikely 
to be able to impose on their colleagues a firm policy direction 
(Table 3) .
There are naturally country variations in the 
distribution of these short-term ministers of finance. In seven 




























































































ministers having held the post for two years or less. In five 
countries, the proportion of short-term ministers of finance is 
lower, these being Germany (where no minister of economics 
remained in office for such a short period), Austria, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, and Norway. On the other hand, the proportion of 
short-term ministers of finance is appreciably higher in two 
countries, Italy and Finland. In this last country, as many as 18 
of the twenty-two ministers who ran the Treasury between 1945 and 
1984 remained in office for two years or less, while in Italy the 
equivalent figures are 13 out of seventeen. Thus, on the basis of 
this indicator at least, it seems unlikely that Finnish or Italian 
finance ministers should have had a very large influence, given 
moreover that neither country had a more than average proportion 
of specialists among these ministers.
Short-term ministers may be numerous, but, as they are 
short-term, they are in office in the aggregate for limited 
periods only. Also on the aggregate, the longer term ministers, 
those who can be expected to exercise substantial influence, can 
on the contrary occupy the post of head of the Trasury during a 
large proportion of the period of analysis, even if there are 
fewer of them. Indeed, as the minister becomes more senior, his 
influence is likely to increase somewhat as time passes, though 
probably at a declining rate. Yet, as it would be hazardous to 




























































































such an influence over time, it is more prudent simply to consider 
as senior those ministers of finance or of economics who held the 
position for more than two years and to calculate the proportion 
of the period of analysis during which countries had ministers of 
finance who had reached this level of seniority. In six countries, 
Austria, Denmark, the French Fifth Republic, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Norway, this was achieved for about half the 
time. In three countries, Belgium, Britain, and Italy, ministers 
of finance with three years' seniority or more were in office 
only a third to two-fifths of the time, however, while in a 
fourth, Finland, there were finance ministers of this extent of 
seniority for 15 percent of the time only. At the other end of the 
scale, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Sweden were ruled by 
senior finance ministers for between two-thirds and three-quarters 
of the time. There are some differences between finance ministers 
stricto sensu and economics ministers, but they do not change the 
position of the country, except in the somewhat special cases of 
Iceland and Luxembourg where many ministers hold more than one 
portfolio and classifications of positions are therefore somewhat 
arbitrary.
Thus, if one considers the extent to which cabinets are 
likely to have a finance minister with at least some experience in 
the job, Belgium, Britain, and Italy score rather low and Finland 




























































































high. This is reflected in the fact that the absolute number of 
finance ministers is small in both countries. Indeed, Sweden would 
score even higher, were it not for the fact that the first 
Treasury head of the period left office in 1948 and thus appears 
to have been in office four years only while, in reality, he had 
occupied the post since 1932, and that some degree of 
'instability' occurred between 1976 and 1982 when 'bourgeois' 
governments were in office. Meanwhile, for half the period which 
is analysed here, the ministry of finance was held in Sweden by 
one individual only, G. Straeng, for 21 years. This is the 
absolute record of longevity among Western European Treasury heads 
since World War II (together with P. Werner of Luxembourg), the 
next longest holder of a post in the field being the German 
economics minister, L. Ehrard who held the position for fifteen 
years. Thus Sweden and, at some distance behind, Germany and 
Luxembourg are the countries in which ministers of finance with a 
very long experience are most likely to be found.
Overall, in terms of duration in the post of minister of 
finance, Sweden and Finland occupy the two most extreme positions. 
Germany and Luxembourg are somewhat behind Sweden while Belgium, 
Britain, and Italy are somewhat above Finland. The rest of the 
countries occupy an intermediate position. It is interesting to 
note that in none of the countries at the bottom of the range were 




























































































seems to suggest that, in Finland in particular, but in Belgium, 
Britain, and Italy as well, ministers of finance are unlikely to 
be very influential. At least they appear likely to be appreciably 
more influential in Sweden and Germany.
Previous experience in office of ministers of finance
As all other ministers, ministers of finance may hold 
more than one post in the course of their career and they may have 
held at least some of these other posts before becoming finance 
ministers. Indeed, it is often believed that there is a cursus 
honorum and that the post of minister of finance, being among the 
most important which can be achieved in the cabinet, is likely to 
be obtained only after a minister has served in another position. 
Given that the proportion of one-post ministers is very large, at 
least in some countries, given also that, as we saw, ministers of 
finance did not remain in the cabinet, on average, longer than 
other ministers, one should perhaps not expect such a cursus 
honorum to be a widespread feature in Western European 
governments. But, where ministers of finance have had previous 
cabinet experience, they come to the Treasury with some seniority 





























































































As a matter of fact, 123 or 57 percent of the 218 
ministers who were heads of the Treasury since 1945 in the 
countries which are examined here had a post in the cabinet 
outside the finance or economics departments. This is a 
substantially higher proportion than obtains for all ministers, 
but, there are variations. In four countries (Austria, Finland, 
France, and Iceland), the proportion is about the same and it is 
even somewhat lower in Luxembourg than among all ministers. At the 
other extreme, in Britain, no minister of finance, in Italy only 
four out of seventeen and in Denmark only 5 out of nineteen were 
one-post cabinet ministers. Overall, in half the countries 
(Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and Norway) half the finance ministers or more (indeed as many as 
9 out eleven in Austria) had only one post. For these finance 
ministers, it is therefore difficult to speak of a ministerial 
'career' in the true sense of the word. Yet it remains the case 
that, overall, ministers of finance are more likely to move from 
post to post than other ministers. If, as seems at least prima 
facie valid, ministers who have held more than one post are likely 
to be more influential overall than ministers whose ministerial 
'career' was in one department only, then, on this ground alone, 
those cabinet members who become ministers of finance can be 




























































































Yet the seniority that those who become ministers of 
finance acquire by holding different posts is likely to have 
diverse effects on the influence which they will be able to 
exercise when they are ministers of finance. The influence which 
they will exercise in that job will be increased by tenure in 
other jobs only insofar as these other jobs were occupied before 
holding a post at the head of the Treasury; conversely, those 
ministers of finance whose first cabinet job was as head of the 
Treasury are likely to be less influential precisely because it is 
their first cabinet job. Underlying this situation is probably a 
different view about the nature of the post of minister of 
finance. Where the Treasury job is regarded as truly special, 
cabinet ministers are likely to come to that position only after 
having served in an 'apprenticeship' capacity, so to speak, in 
another cabinet post. Where this does not occur or rarely occurs, 
the view is likely to be that a position as head of the Treasury 
is not truly special.
In Western Europ[e, it seems that the post of finance 
minister is often not regarded as special in this manner. There 
are first all those ministers of finance who have one cabinet 
position only ever. There is also a further and substantial number 
who held other cabinet positions after having been at the head of 
the Treasury. Out of the 218 ministers being analysed here, 95 had 




























































































being in the Treasury. Thus 152 ministers , or slightly over two- 
thirds of the total, had no previous cabinet experience before 
being finance ministers. Admittedly, this figure is a little 
inflated, in part because the early period of the analysis 
coincides with a reconstruction of the political system in a 
majority of the countries studied (Austria, Germany, Italy, as 
well as the Benelux countries, Denmark, Norway, and Fifth Republic 
France). The figure is also inflated because in a number of 
countries a party came to power after having been in opposition 
for so long that none or very few of its leading members could 
have had cabinet experience (Britain in 1964, Sweden in 1976, 
France in 1981 are among the clearest cases). Yet, even if 
allowance is made for these situations, about half the ministers 
of finance would none the less have come to office without 
previous cabinet experience. Thus it is not the case that, in 
general, ministers of finance have to follow a prolonged 
apprenticeship in the cabinet before becoming heads of the 
Treasury. There is no universal rule suggesting that the Treasury 
should be reached by cabinet ministers only after they had first 
been in other positions.
Although the rule is not universal, it does seem to apply 
to a minority of cabinets. One the one hand, in eight countries, 
as many as three-quarters of the ministers of finance had never 




























































































finance came to office after having another cabinet post in 
Austria, and only two in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Finland. But in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden, 
between one-third and three-fifths of the finance or economics 
ministers had had a post in the cabinet before, while, in Britain, 
only J. Callaghan became Chancellor of the Exchequer without 
having had any previous cabinet experience. Indeed, even this 
single case can be regarded as accidental, as the sudden elevation 
of this minister to the Treasury was due to the dearth of 
politicians with cabinet experience on the Labour benches after 
the party had been thirteen years in opposition between 1951 and 
1964 (Table 5).
Such marked variations no doubt reflect differences in
the view which different governments have about the status and
character of the position of finance minister. While, as we saw,
British Chancellors of the Exchequer, as well as their
counterparts in Ireland and Italy, remain in these posts for a
relatively short period, the office of minister of finance is 
manifestly regarded as intrinsically important and is consequently 
almost never awarded immediately. To a lesser extent, this view 
appears to be held in Sweden and Denmark. In other Western 
European countries, on the other hand, whatever view may be held 




























































































ministers to prepare themselves for the job by means of another 
cabinet position.
As a result, in some countries, finance ministers are 
likely to be experienced cabinet ministers when they come to lead 
the Treasury. They are consequently more likely to be able to 
exercise influence over their colleagues from the moment they take 
their Treasury job than in countries where they are new to the 
cabinet. They may, as a result, be able to play a leading part 
even if they remain at the head of the Treasury for relatively 
short periods. This suggests that the ranking of the potential 
influence of Treasury heads based on duration in the post itself 
should be appreciably modified, in particular with respecto to
Britain, Ireland, and Italy,r as wqell as, though to a lesser
extent, with respect to Denmark and Sweden. If, as we did
previously for positions at the head of the Treasury, we regard
any minister who has been more than two years in the cabinet as 
having reached the level of seniority required to be able to 
exercise significant influence (although, as was pointed out for 
ministers of finance, this influence is likely to continue to 
increase somewhat afterwards, in most cases at least), ministers 
of finance can be regarded as having had the opportunity to be 
influential in Britain and Ireland (and indeed in Luxembourg as 
well) for as long as in Sweden and for a longer period than in 




























































































held in the cabinet before becoming head of the Treasury may not 
provide ministers with the same amount of influence as a position 
in the Treasury. Moreover, the job of minister of finance has to 
be learnt and, for a time at least, the head of the Treasury is
likely to be 'on trial' and his ability to adapt to the office is
likely to be tested. Yet the existence of a cursus honorum in
Britain, Ireland, and Italy, as well as to a lesser extent in
Denmark and Sweden has almost certainly the effect of enhancing 
appreciably the influence of incoming finance ministers in these 
countries.
The presence or absence of ex-ministers of finance in the cabinet
While some ministers of finance begin their cabinet 
career in other posts, some remain in or return to the cabinet 
after having left the Treasury. These, too, are a minority of the 
finance ministers of about the same size as is the group of 
finance ministers who begin their career in other posts. In the 
fourteen countries examined here, 78 ministers of finance or of 
economics occupied later another cabinet position. 28 of these 
were ministers who had begun their career as ministers of finance, 
but two-thirds of them (50) both began and ended their career in 
departments other than finance or economics, twenty of whom where 




























































































The distribution of ex-ministers of finance who held 
cabinet positions later varies markedly across Western Europe. At 
one end of the scale, no Swedish and only one Austrian ex-minister 
of finance remained in or returned to the cabinet. At the other, 
two-thirds of the British and Italian ex-ministers of finance were 
part of subsequent cabinets. Half the ministers of finance were 
members of later cabinets in France, Norway, Ireland, and Iceland 
and a quarter to a third in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Finland.
An ex-minister of finance who returns to the cabinet is 
likely to be able to exercise some influence, at least in many 
cases, by virtue of this experience. This means that, conversely, 
the presence of an ex-minister of finance in a cabinet will tend 
to have a negative effect on the role of the current Treasury 
head, even if, as is no doubt sometimes the case, both ministers 
try to reduce this effect. Moreover, the situation is likely to be 
different when the cabinet has only occasionally an ex-minister of 
finance and when such an occurrence is almost continuous. In the 
first case, the ex-Treasury head is likely to regard this 
situation as exceptional and to exercise restraint. In the second 
case, a substantial and almost regular reduction of the autonomy 
of the minister of finance is likely to ensue. In this respect, 
varaitions are large across Western Europe. At one end of the 




























































































Sweden and only one in Austria (for a total period of five years). 
At the other, ex-ministers of finance were present in over twenty- 
five of the forty years in Britain, Ireland, and Italy. These 
three countries are also those in which one also finds the largest 
number of cases in which more than one ex-minister of finance was 
in the cabinet at the same time, a situation which is likely to 
reduce even further the influence of the current Treasury head.
One post which ex-ministers of finance often occupy is 
that of prime minister (and/or in Finland and Fifth Republic 
France of president of the Republic). Twenty-five of the Western 
European prime ministers were indeed drawn from among ex-ministers 
of finance. This number, although large, does not perhaps 
constitute as high a proportion as might have been expected, given 
the importance which the position of head of the Treasury is 
usually assumed to have. On average, only one in nine of the 
ministers of finance can hope to become prime ministers one day. 
Even in countries in which mobility from post to post is high 
among cabinet members, few ex-ministers of finance become prime 
ministers. Only two British ex-ministers of finance, H. Macmillan 
and J. Callaghan, became prime ministers; there were also only two 
in Ireland, J. Lynch and C. Haughey; perhaps even more 
surprisingly, there were only three in Italy, G. Pella, E. 
Colombo, and G. Andreotti. It is in Finland that the probability 




























































































is highest: four - or one in five - of the former Treasury heads 
of that country became heads of the government, one of these 
having also become president of the Republic (M. Koivisto).
Yet, if it is perhaps not the case that a position of 
minister of finance constitutes a springboard to the prime 
ministership, the influence of the head of the Treasury is likely
to be reduced when this situation obtains. Conversely, the
minister of finance is likely to be stronger where, as in
particular in Sweden, no ex-minister of finance had ever to
contend with a prime minister - or indeed any other colleague - 
having been head of the Treasury. Only Austria, the Netherlands 
(as far as the ministry of finance stricto sensu is concerned), 
and Luxembourg come close to achieving a similar record (indeed, 
in the case of the last of these countries the prime minister was 
also for many years either the finance or the economics minister). 
If one also notes that, as a result of the existence of a minister 
of economics in a number of countries, ministers of finance are 
confronted with colleagues whose approach is often different from 
theirs, partly because the aims of the two departments are 
different and partly because, in some cases at least, the two 
ministers belong to two distinct parties, the influence of 
ministers of finance is likely to be reduced, in many cases, as a 
result of the presence of other cabinet-holders who have 




























































































By and large, Britain, Ireland, and Italy are the 
countries which are likely to experience the greatest reduction in 
the influence of the current minister of finance as a result of 
the presence of ex-Treasury heads in the cabinet. But at least an 
occasional reduction of influence is likely to have occurred in 
every other Western European country except Sweden. Meanwhile, in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxembourg, as 
well as even in some periods in Germany, the existence of two 
distinct posts of finance and of economics must have contributed 
to some reduction of the role of the minister of finance within 
the cabinet.
Towards a typology of the influence of ministers of finance
The study of the careers of ministers of finance in 
Western European countries revealed substantial differences with 
respect to four characteristics likely to affect the influence of 
these ministers within the cabinet. First, some Treasury heads are 
better prepared for the job than others. While, overall, about 
half the ministers of finance could be regarded as specialists 
(more than the general population of cabinet members), 
specialisation was highest among Austrian, Dutch, French, and 
German Treasury heads and lowest among their Irish and Icelandic 
counterparts. This suggests that ministers of finance in the first 




























































































their knowledge and previous experience, than ministers in the 
other two groups.
Second, there are appreciable variations in duration in 
the post, both from minister to minister and from country to 
country. This suggests that, in some cabiners, the Treasury head 
is likely to be able to win arguments more easily with this 
colleagues in view of his experience. In some countries, and in 
particular in Sweden, finance ministers remain in office longer 
than their colleagues, even though all ministers tend to be 
characterised in that country by a remarkable longevity. Without 
attempting to relate influence precisely to the extent of 
seniority of individual Treasury heads, ministers of finance 
appear likely to be more influential as a result in Sweden, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (as well as Luxembourg) than in 
countries where, at the other end of the scale, such as Britain, 
Ireland, Italy, and even more Finland, the duration of ministers 
of finance in office is short on average and where the proportion 
of the time during which an experienced minister of finance is in 
office is relatively small.
Third, ministers of finance who have had more than one 
job in the cabinet are only a small majority. Some had one or more 
jobs before becoming Treasury heads: in these countries, there 




























































































only after some time the position of minister of finance. In 
Britain, Ireland, and Italy in particular, it is the norm for 
cabinet ministers to have first another cabinet post. Such a 
situation obtains to a lesser degree in other countries, such as 
Belgium, Denmark, Fifth Republic France, and Sweden, while it 
scarcely occurs in Austria, Germany, or the Netherlands. Whatever 
the origins of such a difference, it will tend to increase the 
influence of the ministers concerned, since they acquire 
experience of cabinet affairs before becoming heads of the 
Treasury. This situation characterises particularly Britain, 
Ireland, and Italy, as well as, to a lesser degree, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, and Sweden. In the case of the first three of 
these countries, this increased influence may compensate somewhat 
for the relatively shorter experience which most ministers of 
finance have as heads of the Treasury. In the case of Sweden, the 
influence of the ministers of finance is likely to be further 
enhanced.
Fourth, and conversely, the influence of ministers of 
finance is likely to be adversely affected because some of their 
predecessors return to the cabinet to run other departments. This 
situation occurs particularly in Britain, Ireland, and Italy, as 
well as to a more limited extent in Belgium, Denmark, and Finland; 
it never occurs in Sweden and rarely takes place in Austria, 




























































































group of countries can therefore be expected to have a freer hand, 
while those in the first have typically to wrestle with the 
possible comments of colleagues who were previously heads of the 
Treasury. This in turn probably diminishes somewhat the advantage 
which British, Irish, and Italian finance ministers have by being 
members of the cabinet before becoming ministers of finance.
A four-fold typology of influence can therefore be 
outlined on the basis of the analysis of these careers. At one 
extreme, Swedish and, but to a lesser extent, German and 
Luxemburgese finance ministers are likely to be the most 
influential of all. They remain in office for long periods. In 
Sweden, they are likely to have been in the cabinet before, while 
in Germany they have a specialist background. They are never in 
Sweden, and rarely in Germany, overshadowed in the cabinet by 
previous ministers of finance. At the other end of the range is 
Finland, where ministers of finance appear to be relatively weak, 
as they are transient, are not particularly specialised, rarely 
had a previous cabinet job before becoming Treasury heads, and 
have relatively frequently to contend with previous finance 
ministers present in the cabinet.
Most countries are located between these two extremes and 
cluster around two main types. One is primarily represented by 




























































































specialised, stay in office for substantial, but not very long 
periods, tend to have only one cabinet post, but are rarely if 
ever overshadowed by an ex-minister of finance. They are therefore 
probably, on the whole, rather influential, though not as strong 
as their opposite numbers in Sweden or Germany. Fifth Republic 
Republic France and Norway come close to being in this category, 
but with variations which tend to reduce somewhat the influence of 
their ministers of finance. Iceland, too, is somewhat similar, but 
the small size of the cabinet in that country makes it difficult 
to draw definite conclusions.
The other intermediate model characterises primarily 
Britain, Ireland, and Italy, where the level of specialisation of 
finance ministers is average or below average, where the duration 
in office of ministers of finance is relatively short, where a 
cursus honorum exists, as a result of which Treasury heads come to 
their job with some cabinet experience, but where the current 
minister of finance has almost always to count with the presence 
of a colleague who previously held the job, this colleague being 
in some cases the prime minister. In the main ministers of finance 
in these countries are likely to be somewhat less influential than 
their Austrian or Dutch counterparts. Belgium and Denmark are 
close to this category, though ministers of finance in these 




























































































fewer among them had previous cabinet experience before joining 
the Treasury.
* * * * * * *
The careers of ministers of finance in Western Europe are 
thus varied, not just on an individual basis, not even on a 
country basis, but on the basis of broader tendencies which relate 
these careers to what can be regarded as different characteristics 
of cabinet government, whether these are the result of a 
deliberate choice or have come about accidentally. One can thus 
relate these career patterns to the broad distinction between the 
more 'parliamentary' types of cabinet structures, which are 
characteristic of Britain, Ireland, Italy, or Belgium, on the one 
hand, and the more 'managerial' forms, such as those which can be 
found in Austria, Fifth Republic France, or the Netherlands. But 
the careers of ministers of finance have also special features, as 
is shown by the cases of Sweden or Germany at one extreme and of 
Finland, at the other. The very 'orderly' form of cabinet 
government which characterises Sweden reaches its extreme form in 
the case of the minister of finance's position, while the somewhat 
unstable nature of Finnish cabinet politics is reflected 
particularly at the level of the Treasury post. In the German 
case, the higher level of specialisation of Tresury heads, in both 




























































































helps to give those who run these departments a prestige and an 
influence which, as in Sweden, goes beyond that of other 
ministers. Thus the career of minister of finance reveals special 
characteristics of cabinet government among Western European 
countries, while reinforcing some of the trends which can oe 
identified by examining in general cabinet: positions. A scrutiny 
of some of the other 'top' cabinet posts may reveal further 
characteristics and contribute to a fuller understanding of the 
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